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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The State appeals from the district court's ruling granting Brent Jacob Tyler's 
motion to suppress evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
At about 8:06 p.m. on November 11, 2010, the Twin Falls narcotics interdiction 
unit requested that Officer Arredondo enforce a traffic stop on a vehicle they had 
watched commit a traffic violation. (Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.?, L.12.) Officers from the 
narcotics unit had observed the vehicle leaving a known drug house. (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-
22.) The driver of the vehicle, while driving erratically, had made an illegal u-turn. (Tr., 
p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.14; p.34, Ls.6-11.) Officer Arredondo enforced the traffic stop. (Tr., 
p.22, Ls.21-24; p.34, Ls.6-?) 
Officer Arredondo made contact with the driver of the vehicle, Albert Conway, 
who Officer Arredondo knew was on supervised felony probation for possession of a 
controlled substance. (Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.1.) Familiar with the terms of Mr. 
Conway's felony probation, including his Fourth Amendment waiver, Officer Arredondo 
informed Mr. Conway that he would be conducting a search of his person and vehicle, 
and had him exit the car. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.18.) 
Tyler was the only other passenger in the vehicle. (Tr., p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.2.) 
Dressed in layers for the weather, Tyler was wearing a t-shirt, under a button-up flannel 
shirt with two breast pockets, under a zip-up hoodie, under a jacket. (Tr., p.35, LS.10-
14.) For officer safety, Officer Arredondo requested that Tyler also exit the car so he 
could conduct the search. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-15.) As Tyler exited the vehicle, Officer 
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Arredondo asked if Tyler had any weapons. (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-21; see also State's Ex. 
1.) Tyler responded, "No, I don't," then changed his mind and said, "Yes, sir, I do." 
(State's Ex. 1.) Officer Arredondo warned Tyler not to reach for the weapon as Tyler 
declared that he had an X-Acto knife in one of the pockets on his flannel shirt and then 
opened his jackets to reveal the knife's blade protruding from his left breast pocket. 
(Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.6; p.25, Ls.11-13; p.36, Ls.6-12; see also State's Ex. 1.) 
Officer Arredondo could see the X-Acto knife protruding from the pocket. (Tr., p.13, 
Ls. 7 -18; p.26, Ls.2-6.) 
Tyler attempted to remove the X-Acto knife from his pocket several times, and 
Officer Arredondo had to command him not to touch it. (Tr., p.30, Ls.1-11; p.36, LS.13-
19; see also State's Ex. 1.) Officer Arredondo asked if Tyler had any other weapons. 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.21-23; see also State's Ex. 1.) Tyler again responded, "No, I don't." 
(State's Ex. 1.) Officer Arredondo asked Tyler, "Do you mind if I pat you down?" 
(State's Ex. 1; see also Tr., p.13, Ls.24-25; p.26, Ls.7-12.) Tyler consented, 
responding, "It's okay to pat me down. A Terry1 search is fine, but I'm not going to give 
you permission to dig through my pockets." (State's Ex. 1; see also Tr., p.14, Ls. 1-6; 
p.26, Ls.13-15; p.37, Ls.3-6.) 
Officer Arredondo removed the X-Acto knife from Tyler's left breast pocket, then 
immediately patted down the companion right breast pocket on Tyler's flannel shirt, 
patting the pocket down directly. (Tr., p.14, Ls.7-18; p.26, Ls.16-19; p.36, L.25 - p.37, 
L.11.) Patting down the right breast pocket with his open palm, Officer Arredondo felt a 
syringe that seemed to be drawn up. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-25; p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.12.) 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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Before seeing the syringe or removing it from Tyler's pocket, Officer Arredondo asked 
Tyler, "Why do you have a syringe in your pocket?" (State's Ex. 1; see also Tr., p.17, 
Ls.7-16.) Tyler did not respond. (State's Ex. 1; see also Tr., p.17, Ls.17-20.) Officer 
Arredondo removed the syringe and continued with his search, finding crystal 
methamphetamine and OxyContin pills in Tyler's pants pocket. (Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.19, 
L.18.) Tyler was placed under arrest. (Tr., p.18, Ls.16-21; p.28, L.19 - p.29, L.1; see 
also State's Ex. 1.) 
Because Tyler had previously been convicted with possession of a controlled 
substance, the State charged Tyler with possession of methamphetamine with a 
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.81-83.) Tyler moved to suppress the evidence 
found by Officer Arredondo during the traffic stop, challenging the scope of the Terry 
frisk. (R., pp.104-11.) The district court found that the scope of Officer Arredondo's 
protective search impermissibly extended beyond that permitted in a Terry frisk, and 
granted Tyler's suppression motion. (R., p.131; Tr., p.52, L.25 - p.54, L.3.) The State 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.135-37.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it concluded that a protective search for weapons 
was so limited in scope under Terry v. Ohio and its progeny as to only permit a pat-
down of the outermost layer of clothing, precluding the patting down of pockets on inner 
layers of clothing that are exposed to an officer's view? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Granting Tyler's Suppression Motion On The Erroneous 
Theory That An Officer Cannot Directly Pat-Down Pockets Which Are Exposed To 
Public View Whenever A Defendant Is Wearing A Jacket 
A. Introduction 
After finding that Tyler consented to a Terry frisk, the district court held that 
Officer Arredondo exceeded the scope of a proper Terry frisk when he directly patted 
down an exposed breast pocket on Tyler's flannel shirt, rather than patting down the 
pocket through the jackets Tyler was wearing. (Tr., p.52, L.25 - p.54, L.1.) Application 
of the correct legal standard to the facts presented at the suppression hearing shows 
that Officer Arredondo's pat-down did not exceed the scope of a reasonable Terry frisk. 
The district court erred in holding otherwise; its judgment should therefore be reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 
160 P.3d 739,741 (2007). 
C. The Pat-down Performed By Officer Arredondo Did Not Exceed The Reasonable 
Standards Associated With A Protective Terry Frisk 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that U[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
"[T]he 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'" Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)); see also 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). Reasonableness "depends 'on a 
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free 
from arbitrary interference by law officers.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 
(1977) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). "[T]he 
reasonableness of a search is determined 'by assessing, on the one hand, the degree 
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other hand, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'" United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done pursuant to consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State v. 
Hansen, 138 Idaho 791,796,69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). Freely and voluntarily given consent validates a search. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted). The voluntariness of an individual's 
consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the 
circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 
248-49). "Additionally, when the basis for a search is consent, the government must 
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conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search." State v. Thorpe, 
141 Idaho 151,154,106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). In this case, 
the district court found that Tyler voluntarily consented to a Terry frisk. (Tr., p.50, L.20-
p.52, L.2.) That finding is amply supported by the record. (See Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, 
L.6; p.26, Ls.7-15; p.37, Ls.3-6; see also State's Ex. 1.) 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
police officer may conduct a pat-down search of an individual if the officer has 
reasonable suspicion that the person may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry, 
392 U.S. at 24; see also State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 933, 829 P.2d 520, 523 
(1992); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
justification for such a search is the protection of police officers in the performance of 
their duties. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. "The purpose of this limited search is not to discover 
evidence of a crime, but to allow the Officer to pursue his investigation without fear of 
violence." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Rawlings, 121 Idaho at 933, 
829 P.2d at 523. Thus, the scope of the frisk must be "reasonably designed to discover 
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. 
Application of the above legal standards to the facts presented at the 
suppression hearing shows that Officer Arredondo did not exceed the scope of a proper 
Terry frisk during his protective search for weapons. After asking Tyler to exit the car so 
he could search the vehicle, Officer Arredondo asked if Tyler had any weapons. (Tr., 
p.12, Ls.6-21; see also State's Ex. 1.) Tyler first responded, "No, I don't" then corrected 
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himself, admitting that he had an X-Acto knife in the left breast pocket of his flannel 
shirt. (Tr., p.35, Ls.3-9; see also State's Ex. 1.) 
Tyler opened his jackets, exposing his flannel shirt and the X-Acto knife to Officer 
Arredondo's view. (Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.18; p.36, Ls.6-12.) Tyler then made 
multiple attempts to retrieve the knife and Officer Arredondo had to command Tyler 
several times not to reach for the X-Acto knife. (Tr., p.30, Ls.1-11; p.36, Ls.13-19; see 
also State's Ex. 1.) Officer Arredondo asked if Tyler had any other weapons. (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.21-23; see also State's Ex. 1.) Tyler responded, "No, I don't." (State's Ex. 1.) 
Officer Arredondo requested permission to perform a pat-down, and Tyler 
consented to a Terry frisk. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.6; p.37, Ls.3-6; see also State's Ex. 
1.) With Tyler's fingers interlaced behind his back, allowing Officer Arredondo to control 
them from behind Tyler, Officer Arredondo reached around and removed the X-Acto 
knife from the left breast pocket on Tyler's flannel shirt and then immediately patted 
down the companion right breast pocket directly over the exposed flannel shirt. (Tr., 
p.14, Ls.7-18; p.27, Ls.3-4; p.36, L.25 - p.37, L.11.) In the right breast pocket, Officer 
Arredondo felt what he immediately recognized was a syringe. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-25; p.27, 
L.23 - p.28, L.12.) Because Tyler's jackets were opened and his flannel shirt exposed, 
Officer Arredondo did not have to unbutton, unzip, remove, or in any way manipulate 
the jackets to pat-down the pocket where he felt the syringe. (Tr., p.29, Ls.7-25.) 
Officer Arredondo's protective search for weapons was thus minimally intrusive and 
reasonably designed to discover hidden instruments that could be used to assault the 
officer or others nearby. 
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Nonetheless, the district court held that Officer Arredondo's limited search for 
weapons exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk because Officer Arredondo directly patted 
down the exposed flannel shirt pocket rather than patting the pocket down through 
Tyler's jackets, and the district court understood a Terry frisk to only involve the officer 
patting down the outermost layer of clothing. (Tr., p.52, L.25 - p.54, L.1.) Such a 
narrow interpretation of the holding in Terry v. Ohio was rejected by the very Court that 
issued the opinion. Though the facts in Terry involved an officer patting down the 
outermost layer of clothing in a limited search for weapons, the United States Supreme 
Court was careful to hold in that case: 
We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which 
the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for 
weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete 
factual circumstances of individual cases. See Sibron v. New York, [392 
U.S. 40 (1968)], decided today. Suffice it to note that such a search, 
unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified 
by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of 
crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). The sole 
justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the 
police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in 
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, 
or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the district court's interpretation, under Terry, a protective search for 
weapons simply "must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of 
weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Terry, 392 U.S. at 
25-26. The right of persons to be free from unreasonable government intrusions "must 
be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For 'what the Constitution forbids is 
not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry, 392 
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U.S. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). The question for 
reviewing courts is an objective one: "Would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that 
the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). 
Appellate courts, applying the Supreme Court's holding in Terry to the specific 
factual circumstances presented before them, have consistently justified far more 
intrusive searches than that conducted by Officer Arredondo in this case. The Supreme 
Court itself has held that an officer may reach into a suspect's clothing, such as his belt, 
if he has specific information leading him to believe that a weapon may be concealed 
there. Adams, 407 U.S. at 148. Federal and State Courts, giving due regard to the 
specific circumstances confronting officers, have similarly held that protective searches 
for weapons are not limited to patting down the outermost layer of clothing. See. e.g., 
United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (directing a defendant to lift his 
shirt before conducting a preliminary pat-down was objectively reasonable where the 
defendant ran from the officer, then lied to the officer, and where the officer had 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant could be armed); United States v. Thompson, 
597 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1979) (reaching into defendant's coat pocket for a weapon 
was objectively reasonable where the defendant repeatedly tried to reach into his own 
pocket despite the officers' warnings not to, in addition to the difficulty of determining 
through a traditional pat-down whether a pocket of the defendant's bulky coat concealed 
a weapon); United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (lifting the 
defendant's shirt without a preliminary pat-down was objectively reasonable under Terry 
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where the defendant was stopped within five hundred feet of an armed bank-robbery 
and where a bulge in his clothing could have been a weapon); U.S. v. Edmonds, 948 
F.Supp. 562, 566 (E.D.va. 1996) (lifting a defendant's shirt was objectively reasonable 
where the defendant was in a parked car in a tow-away zone with the engine off located 
in a high-crime area at night, and where the defendant acted nervously when asked to 
lift his shirt), affirmed, 149 F.3d 1171 (4th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Terry, 718 F.Supp. 1181, 
1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (reaching under an open leather jacket to expose a bulge under 
defendant's sweater was objectively reasonable for officer safety), affirmed, 927 F.2d 
593 (2nd Cir. 1991); Stanley v. United States, 6 A.3d 270, 276-77 (D.C. 2010) (shaking 
a defendant's belt was objectively reasonable where the officer believed the belt could 
be used to conceal a weapon); North Carolina v. Smith, 562 S.E.2d 899 (N.C. App. 
2002) (lifting defendant's shirt to expose a possible weapon was objectively reasonable 
where the officer recognized the defendant from police safety bulletins and court 
proceedings, the defendant attempted to hide a bulge in his pants from the officer's 
view, and acted nervously). While general exploratory searches for evidence are 
precluded under Terry and its progeny, any limited intrusion that is reasonably designed 
to uncover hidden instruments that could be used to assault the officer is allowed. 
In this case, Tyler was a passenger in a vehicle that had recently left a known 
narcotics house in the evening hours. When asked if he had any weapons, Tyler first 
denied, then changed his answer and admitted that he did have weapons. Tyler then 
opened his jackets to reveal a hidden instrument that could have been used to assault 
the officer, in this case an X-Acto knife, in the left breast pocket of his flannel shirt. 
Tyler attempted to reach into his pocket and remove the X-Acto knife at least three 
11 
times despite the officer's continued warnings not to. Tyler's right breast pocket was 
just as accessible as his left breast pocket and could have as easily concealed another 
hidden instrument that could be used to assault the officer, and in fact did conceal one. 
(See Tr., p.16, LsA-12 (syringes can be used as weapons).) Considering all the 
circumstances that confronted Officer Arredondo, merely patting down the exposed 
companion right breast pocket directly over the flannel shirt was objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment and justified by the rationale adopted in Terry. 
The United States Supreme Court, recognizing that law enforcement officials 
literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles during the course of 
investigative traffic stops, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973), has 
consistently accorded officers wide latitude to protect themselves. Officer Arredondo 
did not exceed that latitude when, after removing the X-Acto knife from the exposed left 
breast pocket of Tyler's flannel shirt, he immediately patted down the exposed 
companion right breast pocket on the same shirt. 
Correctly applying the law to the facts presented at the suppression hearing, the 
question for this Court is simply whether Officer Arredondo's search and seizure was 
reasonable both at its inception and as conducted. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-29. 
Officer Arredondo's search was reasonable at inception based on Tyler's consent. 
Officer Arredondo's search was reasonable as conducted based on its narrow, 
reasonable design, meant to discover hidden weapons that could be used to assault the 
officer. The district court erred in holding that Officer Arredondo's limited pat-down 
search for weapons exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. The judgment of the district 
court should be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting Tyler's suppression motion, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 2012. 
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